Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2001

James F. Trees v. Walter Lewis : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Allen, Thompson, and Hughes; Michael D. Hughes; Attorney for Respondent; Snow and Nuffer;
Attorneys for Respondent.
Bell and Bell; J. Richard Bell; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Trees v. Lewis, No. 19333.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1659

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

gmicr
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU

45.9
/S9
DOCKET MO,
J. RICHARD BELL
JACQUE B. BELL
BELL 8e BELL
303 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone 487-7756
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant Walter Lewis
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JAMES F. TREES

)

Plaintiff-Respondent)
vs.

)

WALTER LEWIS

)

No. 19333

Defendant-Appellant. )
A- pf -e l (7»-/J'

BRIEF ON APPEAL

Appeal from the Decision of the District Court of Washington
County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Harlan Burns, District
Court Judge, granting judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, James F.
Trees and against the Defendant, Walter Lewis.
ALLEN, THOMPSON Sc HUGHES
Michael D. Hughes
Attorney for Respondent
148 East Tabernacle
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (801) 673-4892

BELL & BELL
J. Richard Bell
Attorneys for Appellants
303 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Telephone: (801) 437-7756

SNOW & NUFFER
Attorneys for Respondent
P.O. Box 386
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (801) 628-1613
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

APR

jCJd-f

Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

J. RICHARD BELL
JACQUE B. BELL
BELL 8c BELL
303 'East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone 487-7756
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant Walter Levis
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JAMES F. TREES

)

Plaintiff-Respondent)
vs.

)

WALTER LEWIS

)

No. 19333

Defendant-Appellant. )

/4 pp-emmi1*

BRIEF ON APPEAL

Appeal from the Decision of the District Court of Washington
County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Harlan Burns, District
Court Judge, granting judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, James F.
Trees and against the Defendant, Walter Lewis.
ALLEN, THOMPSON S* HUGHES
Michael D. Hughes
Attorney for Respondent
148 East Tabernacle
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (801) 673-4892

BELL & BELL
J. Richard Bell
Attorneys for Appellants
303 East 2100 South
Salt Lake Citv, Utah
Telephone: (801) 487-7756

SNOW & NUFFER
Attorneys for Respondent
P.O. Box 386
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (801) 628-1613
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

J. RICHARD BELL
JACQUE B. BELL
BELL & BELL
303 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone 487-7756
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant Walter Lewis
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JAMES F. TREES

)

Plaintiff-Respondent)
vs.

)

WALTER LEWIS

)

No. 19333

Defendant-Appellant. )
BRIEF ON APPEAL
Appeal from the Decision of the District Court of Washington
County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Harlan Burns, District
Court Judge, granting judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, James F.
Trees and against the Defendant, Walter Lewis.
ALLEN, THOMPSON & HUGHES
Michael D. Hughes
Attorney for Respondent
148 East Tabernacle
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (801) 673-4892

BELL & BELL
J. Richard Bell
Attorneys for Appellants
303 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Telephone: (801) 487-7756

SNOW & NUFFER
Attorneys for Respondent
P.O. Box 386
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (801) 628-1613
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE NO.
NATURE OF THE CASE . . .

1

DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

2
ARGUMENTS

POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE
COUNTEROFFER WAS NEVER ACCEPTED

7

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THERE
WAS NO MEETING OF THE MINDS BETWEEN THE PARTIES . . 11
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE TWO REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS RELATIVE TO THE REJECTION OF AN OFFER
AND IN FAILING TO GIVE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION
RELATIVE TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS

12

POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING AS ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE THE AGREEMENTS OF JUNE 19 and JUNE 23 . . 14
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE SURPRISE WAIVER
OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AND ALLOWING
ATTORNEY SNOW TO TESTIFY AS TO INTENTION OF
LETTER OF MAY 29

15

POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF ATTORNEYS'
FEES
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20

CASES CITED
Bowman v. Reyburn, 170 P.2d 491 (Utah 1967)

PAGE NO.
...9

Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Bybee
306 P.2d 773 (Utah 1957)

11

Dodge Bros, v Williams Estate Co.
52 Nev 364; 287 P 282, 283

10

F.M.A.Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc.
404 P.2d 670 (Utah 1965)

19

Kimball Elevator Co. v. Elevator Stipplies Co.
272 P.2d 583 (Utah 1954)

10

Mestas v. Martini, 113 Col. 108, 155 Pd 161

10

Phipps v. Sasser, 445 P.2d 624 (Washington 1968)

19

Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 423 P.2d 491 (Utah 1967)

9

R. J. Daum Construction Co. v. Child,
247 P.2d 17 (Utah 1952)

9

Trautwein v. Leavy, 427 P.2d 776 (Wyo 1970)
Ward v. Ward, 94 Co. 275, 30 Pd 853
Webb v. Snow, 132 P.2d 114
OTHER AUTHORITY CITED
I Corbin, Contracts, Sec 94 P. 389 (1963)

....8, 13
10
....14

8, 13

Pomeroys Specific Performance of Contracts, 3rd Ed. §159..10
17 Am Jur 2d, Contracts §18, p 354

12

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED
Statute of Frauds, Title 25, Chapter 5, §1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14

POINT VII
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE FIFTH SPECIAL
INTERROGATORY TO THE JURY
SUMMARY

21
22

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Nature of the case
Plaintiff brought an action for specific performance to acquire
the Lewis Ranch,

He claimed prior to trial that there was an agree-

ment which contained an Option and which Option he exercised.
Plaintiff claimed that there was no agreement but merely an outstanding counteroffer which the Plaintiff never accepted.
Disposition of the Lower Court
This case was heard before Honorable J. Harlan Burns, District
Judge of the Fifth Judicial District in and for Washington County,
State of Utah, who impaneled an advisory jury, adopted the jury's
answers to Special Interrogatories and granted a Judgment and
Decree of Specific Performance.
Relief Sought on Appeal
Defendant Lewis seeks a reversal of the Judgment and Decree
or, in the alternative, a Decision of this Court granting Defendant
a New Trial.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Statement of the Facts
A written Option Agreement was prepared for Plaintiff- Respondant
Trees by a St. George attorney, Steven Snow.

Attorney Snow signed

the agreement as "Attorney in Fact11 for plaintiff Trees after which
it was presented by a real estate agent, Michael Hatch, to DefendantAppellant Lewis at the Chicago Airport on December 4, 1980, about a
year before Defendant Lewis expected to retire and return to Utah
to live.

Hatch worked for Deseret Realty which was owned by Real

Estate Agent, Earl Milne and his wife.

The Option Agreement pertained

to the purchase and sale of the 160 acre Lewis Ranch which abuts
Zion National Park near Springdale, Utah.
The ranch is in a basically non-accessible area but has thereon
an historical old home known as the Shunesberg Mansion9 a residence,
a guest house, a small lake, a swimming pool, with water rights and

,

although basically non-productive was a refuge for Defendant Lewis
who spent his summer and often his Christmas vacations there as
well as visiting on other occasions and who looked forward to his
retirement so that he could use and enjoy the ranch.

,

He acquired

it after the death of his brother who owned it and lived there for
many years.

{

Lewis did not desire to sell the ranch having turned

down several offers and not having ever listed it for sale. His
wife had some physical health problems and since there was no phone
or electricity at the Rach, he did not like to leave her there alone.
He had a lot in Springdale on which he intended to build a home.

He

never at any time
set
a purchase
price,
theLawprice
in this instance
Digitized by
the Howard
W. Hunter Law Library,
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1

having been one offered by the Plaintiff.

James F. Trees, who

resided in New York, contacted real estate agent, Earl Milne,
described what type of property he was interested in finding; flew
over the Lewis ranch and other property in the area and hired Milne
and/or his company to acquire property or options on property, and
Trees agreed to pay all real estate fees in connection with any
purchase.

Agent Milne contacted Lewis who made it clear to Milne

and to plaintiff Trees that Lewis did not desire to sell the
ranch.

Lewis had several conditions primary of which was retaining

60-day visitation rights in the summer and other visitation rights
to hike and move about the ranch.

He desired that the buyer be a

person with whom he could have a good relationship so that he could
enjoy his visitation rights, monitor projects which were going on,
make a contribution to the overall condition of the ranch and
preservation of the area and the historical background and history
of the ranch, and that the buyer be willing to make a gift or
donation to BYU.
Trees visited BYU to see if he approved of the school, which
he did.

Efforts were made with BYU to handle the transaction so

that BYU would obtain part of the sales price as a gift or donation
but that effort failed because of tax law complications.
The Option Agreement contained, inter alia, two important
provisions, both of which are found in paragraph 12 of the Agreement:
12.(First) This document is intended as the final and exclusive
agreement of the parties, and all other agreements related
to this property, between these parties are superseded
hereby and merged herein. (Second) This document may not
be amended, modified or revoked unless by a writing signed
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

by the parties. (The words "First11 and "Second" have
been added for purposes of emphasis)
The Option Agreement, Exhibit 5 and entitled "Real Estate
Option" made no mention whatsoever of Appellant Lewis1 retained
visitation rights, and Lewis was appalled when he found no mention
of visitation rights in the Option Agreement, particularly in view
of the exclusion and merger clause set forth in paragraph 12. He
had little experience in land transactions, and none with options.
However, he did refuse to sign until there was added to the bottom
of the Option Agreement the following:
Additionally, it is understood that there exists an
agreement between optionee and optionor for mutually
agreeable visitation rights for optionor.
Further, paragraph 9 was amended relative to the prepayment penality
clause.

After these changes were penned in, at the airport, o&iy

then did Lewis sign the Option Agreement.
At this point, the Option Agreement became a "Counteroffer"
and will be referred to as such hereafter, except as otherwise
noted.

The Counteroffer was never accepted in writing as required

by paragraph 12 (or otherwise) by either Attorney in Fact Snow or
the Plaintiff, Trees.
The Counteroffer was signed by Lewis on the 4th day of
December, 1980.

Thirteen days later on December 17, 1980, Lewis

drafted an "AGREEMENT" between himself and Trees which provided
that there was an agreement between the parties wherein Lewis
retains certain visitation rights for the remainder of his life
which includes 60-days annual "in residence" at the ranch and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the opportunity to visit, move, ride, hike, and moniter projects on
the property at other times.

Lewis signed the Agreement (Exhibit 14)

and gent it to Agent Hatch, together with a covering letter (Exhibit
15) requesting Hatch to have Trees sign the Agreement and return a
signed copy to him.
The Counteroffer required the option set forth therein to be
exercised on or before December 31, 1980.

Because of problems

Trees was having with regard to the purchase by him of DeMille
property which abutted a part of the Lewis ranch, Trees, through
Attorney Snow asked for and received extensions of time to and
including the 30th day of May, 1981, in which to exercise the
Counteroffer.
On or about the 27th of May, 1981, Lewis was informed by Trees
that he was exercising his option to purchase the ranch.

When

Lewis asked about his visitation rights, and told Trees he had no
option until Lewis received his write-up on his visitation rights,
Trees replied that Lewis had no visitation rights, no 60-day visitation rights, and that Trees did not have any information about
them.

Whereupon Lewis told him to call Hatch.

would and that he would call Lewis back.

Trees said that he

Trees immediately contacted

Attorney Snow and for the first time became aware of the agreement
dated December 17, Plaintiff's Exhibit 15.

On May 29, Trees sent a

letter to Lewis which had been dictated to Trees by Attorney Snow
which stated:

M

In accordance with the terms of our contract and

the extensions thereof, I hereby exercise my option to purchase
the property in Utah . . . ." The letter does not mention the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

December 17th Agreement nor does it mention visitation rights at all.
Approximately fourteen days later, following Lewis1 consultation
with an attorney, the attorney for Lewis delivered a letter dated
June 12, 1981, to attorney Snow withdrawing the Counteroffer and
stating that the parties were not in agreement.

Exhibits 16, a

handwritten letter, and 49, a typed copy of the handwritten letter.
During the next ten days, Trees had Milne present to Lewis
a letter form agreement,and an Agreement, both signed by Snow as
Attorney in Fact for Trees, one dated June 19, 1981, the other
dated June 23, 1981. The letter agreement extended some visitation
privileges which consisted of an invitation to Lewis as a friend of
Trees and based upon guest privileges to visit and temporarily
remain as a guest on the property, provided Trees or other guests
were not on the property and further provided that arrangements
must be made and approved by Trees prior to any visit; it did not
bind his heirs and assigns.

The Agreement of June 23 acknowledged

that Lewis had certain visitation rights but limited them to hike
or ride horseback through the property, subject to receiving permission
in advance for each visit, but did not provide for any in-residence
of any kind.

These letters are designated Exhibits 28 and 29,

respectively, both of which were excluded by the Court at trial as
offers of settlement.

Trees did not sign either of them either

letter although each contained a line for his signature.

Notwith-

standing the foregoing, Trees testified at trial that he had
always been willing to grant the visitation set forth by Lewis,
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
including the Digitized
specific
visitation set forth in the December 17
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Agreement.
All payments tendered by Trees had been by check and none were
cashed and all checks were returned immediately following the
withdrawal of the Counteroffer.
want checks sent to him!

Lewis told Snow that he did not

Finally Snow honored Lewis1 request and

stopped sending checks.
This case was tried with an advisory jury with the Court
adopting the Findings or Verdict of the jury.
Additional Facts are hereafter set forth.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE COUNTEROFFER WAS
NEVER ACCEPTED.
The Jury found that the document entitled Real Estate Option
dated November 5, 1980, as amended before signing by Lewis to
provide for visitation rights together with the December 17 Agreement
which spelled out the visitation rights constituted a Counteroffer.
Trees rejected that Counteroffer.

The Counteroffer had to be signed

by Trees as required by the Option in paragraph 12. Neither the
Option of December 5 as amended nor the December 17th Agreement was
signed by Trees or his attorney in fact Snow.

In addition, in the

telephone conversation on May 27 when Trees said he was exercising
his option he testified, T. Vol I, p. 171"
. . . And then he (Lewis) blurted out, "Where are the rights
for my 60-day rights?" And I didn't know anything about his
by the Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library,"Walter,
J. Reuben Clark Law
School,have
BYU.
60-day Digitized
rights.
And
I said,
you
no rights, 60Machine-generated
may contain errors.
day rights. What
are youOCR,talking
about?" And he said, "You

call Mike Hatch, he knows.11 And I said, "Okay, I'll call
Mike Hatch and then he'll call you right back' or I'll call
you right back. That was the conversation basically.
Trees thought to himself "Oh my God, Walter is overreaching."
Neither Trees nor Hatch ever called changing the rejection of the
Counteroffer*
The power of acceptance created by an offer or counteroffer is
terminated by communicated rejection of the offer, and it makes no
difference that a time period has been given for accepting the
offer or counteroffer or that the offer or counteroffer requires
acceptance thereof in writing.
389 (1963).

I Corbin, Contracts, Sec. 94. P.

Trautwein v. Leavy, 472 P.2d 776 (Wyo.) (1970)

Having lost the power to accept, the Plaintiff no longer had
power to accept and could not accept thereafter in the absence of
Lewis again reaffirming the offer, which he did not do.

Although

he probably would have done so prior to withdrawing the counteroffer
provided Trees had signed and delivered to him a copy of the December
17 Agreement, T. Vol 1, p. 107.
Trees knew of the residency requirement prerequisite insisted
on by Lewis in all negotiations.

Even though he had not seen the

December 17th Agreement when he rejected the counteroffer, he knew
of the residency requirement as he had received a letter dated
December 6, 1980, the day after the counteroffer was made by Lewis,
addressed to the Superintendant of Zions National Park wherein
Lewis pointed out that he was going to maintain some involvement
and part time residency in the ranch during his life time.
12.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Further, he had ample
timeOCR,
tomaychange
Machine-generated
contain errors. his rejection if he

desired to do so.

He did not.

On May 29, he wrote a letter to

Lewis wherein he stated, "In accordance with the terms of our
contract and extentions thereof I hereby exercise my option to
purchase the property in Utah."

Attorney Snow dictated that letter.

He undoubtedly knew that matters dealing with rights in land had to
be in writing in order to comply with our Statute of Frauds Title
25 Chapter 5 Utah Code Annotated 1953, an amended, and that the
reservation of rights in the ranch for visitation purposes required
compliance with Chapter 5 and particularly Section 1.

There was no

other collateral visitation document in writing supporting the December 17 Agreement until the June 19 and June 23 Agreement which
which were after the time of the withdrawal of the Counteroffer.
The case of R. J. Daum Const. Co. v. Child 247 P2d 17, (Utah)
(1952), recognizes that the Plaintiff in a Specific Performance
case has the burden of proof and that a reply or offer perporting
to accept an offer but which adds a qualification or requires
performance of conditions is not an acceptance but a Counteroffer.
Further, in the case of Specific Performance, the burden of
proof on the Plaintiff is strong.

This is pointed out in the case

of Pitcher vs. Lauritzen, 423 P2d 491 (Utah) (1967), wherein this
Court approvingly cites the 1946 Colorado Case of Bowman vs. Reyburn,
170 P2d 271, where it is said by a unanimous Court at page 276 as follow
In an action for Specific Performance, a contract
must be free from ambiguity and it must be clearly
established that the demand and performance is in accordance with the actual agreement of the parties (Citations
omitted), fa greater degree of certainty is required in the
terms ofDigitized
an agreement,
which
is
to Clark
be Law
specifically
executed in
by the Howard W. Hunter
Law Library,
J. Reuben
School, BYU.
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equity, than is necessary in a contract which is to be the
basis of an action at law for damages1, Pomeroys Specific
Performance of Contracts, 3d Ed,, H 5 9 , in Ward vs. Ward, 94
Co. 275 30 Pd 85,3, also in Mestas vs. Martini, 113 Col. 108,
155 Pd 161. f There is no better est^BTshed principle of
equity jurisprudence than that Specific Performance will not
be decreed when the contract is imcomplete, uncertain or
indefinate.1 Dodge Bros, vs. Williams Estate Co., 52 Nev. 364
287 P 282, 283
~" " ~
It would seem to follow that in this case of a Counteroffer.

This

burden fell on the Plaintiff, in view of the foregoing, to spell
out in his May 29 letter that he was accepting the Counteroffer, or
that he was accepting the "Contract11 as amended by Lewis and as
amended by the December 17 Agreement.

For, in fact, there was no

"Contractfl only an outstanding Counteroffer.

The letter assumes a

"Contract11 and does not accept a Counteroffer but states I hereby
exercise my option".

It assumes a contract existed.

Further,

the silence of Trees left his oral rejection of the counteroffer
very much in effect, for silence is not to be deemed an acceptance.
Kimball Elevator Co. vs. elevator Supplies Co., 272 P2d 583 (Utah)
(1954).
The Plaintiff had the burden of proof in this case which he did
not sustain.

Also, the Option Agreement of December 4 was drawn by

Attorney Snow and signed by him as attorney-in-fact and he dictated
the May 29 Agreement, and to that extent he is "a party" to the
documents; he had knowledge of the December 17 Agreement shortly
after its signing by Lewis. An instrument is to be construed
against the person that draws it, and this is particularly true
where the attorney is a party.

It is submitted that the same is

by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
basically trueDigitized
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theerrors.
attorney-in-fact as well
Machine-generated
OCR, may

as the attorney for the individual for whom he draws documents, and
the same should be construed against him and his client.

Continental

Bank and Trust Co. vs. Bybee, 306 Specific Second 773 (Utah) (1957).
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE
MINDS BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
It is obvious from the foregoing argument in Point I that
there was inter alia no meeting of the minds between Lewis and
Trees.

That conclusion is further supported by the Agreement of June

19 and June 23 signed by his attorney-in-fact relating to visitation
provisions.

As noted, the June 19 letter agreement was an "invitation11

"based on friendship11 and offered as "privileges" to Lewis and his
immediate family.

The Agreement of June 23 reads as follows:
AGREEMENT

During his lifetime, Walter Lewis shall retain certain
visitation rights to hike or horseback ride through the
property.
Mr. Lewis shall have the right to invite a few of his
close friends or family members to accompany him.
Mr. Lewis shall notify Mr. Trees or his foreman concerning these visits and shall receive permission in advance
for each visit.
This agreement shall be binding on the heirs, assigns,
and successors in interest of James F. Trees.
DATED this 23rd day of June, 1981.
It provides for no residency, 60-day or otherwise.
advance permission.

It requires

However, the rights retained by Lewis in his

December 17 Agreement are specific and clear:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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AGREEMENT
As part of the contract for sale of certain properties
by Walter M. Lewis to James F. Trees, there exists an agreement
between the parties that Lewis retains certain visitation
rights during the remainder of his life, and may invite family
and friends to accompany him. These rights include:
60 days annually of "in residence11 at the ranch
house, the dates to be arranged by each party endeavoring to minimally inconvenience the other«
The opportunity to visit or move through the properties at other times to ride or hike to remote points
of to monitor projects, provided that precaution is
always taken not to invade the privacy of Trees.
This agreement is binding on the heirs, executors, administrators
successors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto.
This agreement recognizes what gentlemen would and ought to do in a
close situation as was contemplated by the parties in that in-residence
provision required that "each party endeavoring to minimally inconvenience the other."

It does not say a party shall not or cannot

but is consistant with the language that they endeavor not to
interfer.

It is somewhat stronger with regard to other visitaiton

in that "precaution" is to be taken not to invade the privacy of
i

Trees.

Again this is what gentlemen or neighbors with good feeling

toward each other would do, but here again it is not a prohabition
and it does not require first obtaining the consent of Trees or his
foreman.

Clearly the parties have said different things, and there

was no mutual consent or meeting of the minds on this very essential
element or term as required to form a binding contract.

17 Am Jur

2d, Contracts §18, p. 354.
POINT III
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
contain errors.
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TOmayGIVE
TWO REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS

RELATIVE TO THE REJECTION OF AN OFFER, AND IN FAILING TO GIVE
REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS RELATIVE TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
The following two requested instructions by Lewis were refused and
not given by the Court to the Jury:
The power of acceptance created by an offer or counteroffer is terminated by a communicated rejection. This is true
even though a definite time was given by the offeror for considering his offer or counteroffer and the rejection is made
before that time is expired. Likewise, this is true regardless
of whether the offer or counteroffer requires or does not
require the acceptance to be made in writing. R. Vol II p. 256.
and
An offer or counteroffer once rejected is not subject to
being accepted at a later date in the absence of the offer or
counteroffer being renewed by the party making the same.
R. Vol II p. 260.
The law which Trees relied upon is already set forth above at page
8 namely, Corbin on Contracts and the case of Treautwein vs. Leavy.
Had these instructions been given, the jury would have had a basis
to find that the Plaintiff had rejected the Counteroffer as argued
in Point I.

Such a finding would have eliminated any question for

the jury relative to the May 29 letter.
the failure to give this instruction.

Lewis was prejudiced by

There could be no finding of

the jury on this point since it was not submitted by the Court, and
it can be assumed that the Court did not concur with the instruction
or the law supporting it since the failure to give this instruction
was raised in the MOTION FOR JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANT, R. Vol. 3
P. 196, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, R. Vol. 3 P. 264 and
AFFIDAVIT attached thereto and DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, R. Vol. 3 p. 107.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Requested Instruction relative to the Statute of Frauds reads:
An agreement pertaining to land or an interest in land is
required to be in writing. If such agreement is not in writing
it is void and of no force and effect. Statute of Frauds, Utah
Code Annotated, Chapter 5 Title 25. R. Vol II 274 and 288.
Under the terms of the Option Agreement, a Warranty Deed was
required to be delivered transferring title of the Ranch in fee to
Trees.

As noted elsewhere, Trees did not want a cloud on his deed

(title).

However, Lewis was entitled to have "declared11 his retained

interest in the Ranch in written form, otherwise the Statute of
Frauds would have prevented him from making any successful claim
to his retained visitation rights, and the jury was entitled to so
know, and question the motives of the Plaintiff and his position that
there was a mutual oral agreement for visitation rights.

Oral

visitation rights gave the plaintiff many advantages.
The giving of each of these instructions could and would have
resulted in the jury finding for Lewis.

The errors are prejudicial.

Webb vs. Snow 132 P.2d 114, 102 Utah 435.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING AS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE THE AGREEMENTS
OF JUNE 19 and JUNE 23.
The two Agreements signed by Snow as attorney-in-fact were not
admitted into evidence because of the objection that they were
offers of compromise.

T Vol. II, commencing page 339.

Before the

objection in ruling, Trees had testified that he had always been
willing to accept the Agreement of December 17. These letters were
in direct contradiction to that statement and position.

They were

signed by his attorney-in-fact and he was bound by them and he did
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There is

nothing in these Agreements which indicate that they are offers in
compromise they speak for themselves what Trees was willing to give
to Lewis by way of visitation.

They represent the very tools of

cross examination and the purpose of cross examination in finding
out the truth by pointing out the inconsistancies in prior statements
of a witness and generally impeach him.
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE SURPRISE WAIVER OF ATTORNEYCLIENT RELATIONSHIP AND ALLOWING ATTORNEY SNOW TO TESTIFY AS TO
INTENTION OF LETTER OF MAY 29.
On the second day of trial the Court permitted over the objection
of Lewis, to permit the Plaintiff to waive his client-attorney
relationship with Snow, so as to permit Snow to testify as to the
intention of Trees and Snow relative to the May 29 letter in which
Trees exercises his option under the contract.

This action came as

a complete surprise to Lewis who had not prepared for trial on
that basis.

The large record, transcript and numerous and long

Depositions primarily resulted from the position taken by the
Plaintiff that there was a contract and the option therein was
exercised by the letter of May 29, 1981, and the attempt by Defendant
Lewis to determine how and in what manner the contract came about,
how and in what manner the option came about, and how and in what
manner the claimed option was exercised.

The position of Lewis was

always clear that there was a Counteroffer which was never accepted.
It was not until trial that the Defendant really acknowledged the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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existance of a Counteroffer, and the claimed acceptance thereof.
The COMPLAINT filed by Snow on July 29, 1981, makes no reference
to a Counteroffer although the position of Lewis that a Counteroffer
had been made and withdrawn had been known to him in writing since
June 12, 1981.

The FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT filed by a new attorney

on April 30, 1982, contained fourteen counts and eighty-four paragraphs,
all of which deal only with the December 4th option and none of which
makes reference of any kind to the December 17th Agreement.

Only

four paragraphs deal with the question of a Counterclaim and they
are grudgingly conditional and read as follows:
57. That in the event Defendants position obtained on advise from counsel that he had made a
counteroffer is sustained, knowledge of such a position was
conveyed only as of June 12, 1981.
58.
offer;

That even were the option dealt with as a counter-

(A) Plaintiff's failure to give reasonable, or for
that matter any, notice of his rejection of the same shortly
after its execution on December 4, 1980 (Exhibit A) acts as
an acceptance of the so-called counteroffer; indeed Plaintiff
adopted a course of behavior indicating assent to such
modification; and/or
(B) Plaintiff at all times did accept the so called
counteroffer; and/or
(C) Plaintiff was, upon notification of Defendant's
election to designate the option as a counteroffer, not given
reasonable notice or indeed any notice or opportunity, to
accept or reject the same.
59. Whether designated as an option or a counteroffer,
Plaintiff has been and is ready, willing, and able to perform
his portion of the parties1 agreement.
Interrogatories were sent to Trees requesting in Interrogatory
No. 15:
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the allegations in paragraph 58 B; designate each witness who will
testify in support thereof and state the substance of the testimony
of each witness.11

The Answer sets forth no facts but merely states

that the Plaintiff will rely upon the Depositions of Trees, Snow,
Lewis and Milne together with a check.

These Answers were filed

and mailed December 1, 1982, approximately two months before trial
which commenced on February 9, 1983.

In an almost identical request

with regard to paragraph 59, the Plaintiff responded substantially
the same way but referred to the facts set forth in Plaintiff's PreTrial submitted to the Court on November 12, 1982. R Vol. 2 pg 7 &
8.

An Affidavit of the Plaintiff also filed November 12, sets that

he has read the facts set forth in the Pre-Trial wherein he
acknowledged having read the proposed pre-trial order and "to my
satisfaction these are the facts in the case and I subscribe under
oath to them.11 R Vol. 1 p. 230.

The proposed Pre-Trial Order

referred to is found commencing on P. 235 of the same volume.

The

following facts are contained in the proposed Pre-Trial Order:
That any alleged Counteroffer made by the Defendant was in fact
accepted through performance (P 239) ; that Lewis had added to the
December 4 Agreement visitation rights which rights had been orally
discussed and previously agreed to between the parties (P 253);
that Lewis demanded in a telephone conversation that Trees provide
him with a write up of their agreement on visitation (P 261) ; that
Trees indicated to Hatch that he would consider putting the oral
agreement into writing so long as it did not cloud the Deed (262);
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Lewis even pleading with Lewis to tell them what he wanted relative
to a write up with his visitation rights (262); that the first time
the parties or their agents heard of the concept or word "Counteroffer11
was June 12, 1981 (263); that companion proposals to memorialize
the visitation rights, were mailed by Milne to Lewis on about June 23.
At a hearing on November 12, 1982, an ORDER was entered by the
Court wherein all correspondence between attorney Snow and Trees
was submitted to the Court in camera so that the Court could review
those letters which may reflect in whole or part on the relationship
of the attorney-in-fact so that the attorney-client privilege
would be preserved.

The client-attorney privilege was asserted in

the Deposition of Snow, dated October 28, 1981, at page 4, and the

<

Deposition inquired only into Snow's activity as attorney-in-fact
and did not inquire into matters claimed to be within the privilege.
The matter of Snow's correspondence came before the Court based on
a Motion by the attorney for Lewis.

(

The Order resulted from the

hearing on November 12, 1982, and is dated by the Court "Nunc Pro
Tunc11 on the 29th day of March, 1982, with the word "November11

<

stricken out, but the certificate shows that it was mailed on the
16th day of November, 1982. R. Vol II p. 48.

There was never any

claim or assertion prior to trial that the Plaintiff accepted the

*

Counteroffer of the Defendant specifically including the Agreement
of December 17. However, based on the ruling of the Court, Snow
was permitted to testify what was the intention and the conversation
between him and the Plaintiff Trees relative to the claimed acceptance
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or prevented from being disclosed by virtue of the attorney-client
relationship, the Defendant Lewis would certainly have explored the
same.
A case similar to the present one and which appears to be in
point is that of Phipps vs. Sasser, 445 P.2d P. 624 (Washington)
(1968).

The Court had before it a Motion to depose Plaintifffs

physician before trial, and Plaintiff had asserted the physicianpatient privilege.

The Court upheld the lower Court which denied

the Motion to take the Deposition.

However, the Court opined

at pages 628 and 629 the following:
We would agree that whenever it does become apparent
that the plaintiff must decide in favor of waiver, then
that waiver should not be delayed until the trial itself.
The plaintiff should not have the unfair tactical advantage
of a trial waiver which almost invariably results in a
continuance and, frequently, in the dismissal of the action
and another trial.
Certainly, at some stage in the pre-trial proceedings,
the plaintiff must decide whether he is going to call his
treating physician or physicians, and, if he is, then the
defendant is entitled to know it in time to take the depostion
of such physicians or physicians and prepare to meet their
testimony.
Our civil rules bear the same numbers as the federal
rules, which we have adopted with few changes. The federal
courts, operating under identical rules, seem to have had
little difficulty in accelerating the waiver of privilege
on a case-to-case basis without the necessity of a blanket
waiver.
This case would seem to be in league with the spirit of the
fair play and interest of justice doctrine set down by this Court
in, F. M. A. Financial Corporation vs. Build, Inc. 404 P.2d 670
(Utah) (1965) wherein there had been a failure to plead an affirmathe Howard
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asserted but this Court noted: " . . . If the interests of justice
so require and the opposing party is given a fair opportunity to
meet such a defense, the trial court may permit the issue to be
tried . . • ." As is shown above, Lewis had no fair opportunity
to meet the testimony of Snow because of the assertion of the
attorney-client relationship, the pleadings, the failure to give
any notice of such testimony although great effort was made to
obtain the same, and objection was made at the time of the waiver and
the introduction of the evidence.

Justice requires that Defendant

Lewis be given the opportunity to take Snow's Deposition as to
matters heretofore hidden and covered from the Defendant so that
he may adequately prepare to meet the testimony in a New Trial.

i

POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF ATTORNEYS1 FEES.
This point is based on the assumption for purposes of argument
that the Court may uphold the judgment of the lower Court.
The Court granted that attorney's fee in the sum of FortyFive Thousand ($45,000.00) Dollars as a reasonable attorney's fee.
However, the Plaintiff had asked for a sum double that amount.

The

cost of this trial and particularly attorney's fees on both sides
are enormous because of the conduct of the Plaintiff as set forth
herein and particularly his change of position at trial in finally
announcing that he had accepted the Counteroffer of the Plaintiff
rather than insisting that there was a contract between the parties as
had been done prior thereto and as has been set forth above.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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There

.

was no need for the amount of work and effort put into this case
nor the waste of the Courtfs time.

Had the Plaintiff originally

come forth and said that he had accepted the Counteroffer, the
issues would have been very limited and quickly tried following a
short discovery.

Instead, the Plaintiff makes light of the Counter-

offer theory, until trial, and suggests that it was a figment of
the imagination of the attorney for Trees rather than looking at
the facts to which it finally conceded in claiming to have accepted
the Counteroffer.

The fee is not reasonable.

Reference is made to

DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
JUDGMENT RE:

ATTORNEY'S FEES. R Vol. Ill commencing at page 235,

which further sets forth the Defendant's position without enlarging
this brief.
POINT VII
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE FIFTH SPECIAL INTERROGATORY
TO THE JURY.
The Fifth Special Interrogatory reads as follows:
5. " W e , the jury duly empanelled in the aboveentitled case, find from a preponderance of the
evidence that Exhibit 26 constituted a notice of
default as provided for in Exhibit 5, and that the
Plaintiff failed to cure or correct said default,
and therefore find in favor the Defendant, Walter
Lewis, on all issues." R. Vol II p 333.
The Interrogatory was not necessary but was confusing and misleading.
Counsel for the Defendant, in front of the jury, stipulated that
Exhibit 26 which is the letter of June 12th wherein the Counteroffer
is withdrawn never was intended to be a notice or a compliance of
the Default as
provided
in
December
4th Agreement.
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That had never been the position of Lewis.

Such a position would

have been contrary to the very existence of a counteroffer since it
would have recognized that the December 4th Option Agreement was a
binding contract and there could not have been an outstanding
counteroffer to withdraw.

The Affidavit of the Defendant's attorney,

in connection with the Motion for a New Trial and deals with the
circumstances surrounding the Special Interrogatory No. 5, commencing
at P. 272 R. Vol. III.

Prior to the jury's leaving, Defendant's

counsel approached the Bench together with Plaintiff's counsel and
objected to the Interrogatory that it in affect directed a verdict
in favor of the Plaintiff and requested that the Interrogatory not
be submitted.

Within fifteen minutes after the jury left, Defendant's

counsel again approached the Court together with Plaintiff's Counsel
and requested that the Court withdraw from consideration of Interrogatory No. Five.

The matter was again taken up after the jury

returned and further objection made and denied by the Court.
Vol. IV 730-735.

T

This Interrogatory could not help but confuse
i

the Jury for it suggested there was a contract that that Lewis'
letter of June 12 may have attempted to comply with the Default
Provision.

The Jury had to be confused and the Defendants
I

highly prejudiced.
SUMMARY
One might say, what is all the fuss about since the Plaintiff
buyer is now willing to give to Lewis everything which Lewis
requested including the visitation rights and per the December 17
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Agreement.

In fact that attitude was pursued very heavily by the

lower Court, never on record, in exploring

settlement of this case

to the point that counsel for Lewis felt he was being admonished by
the Court for not pushing his client into a settlement.

R. Vol III

p. 9, 10. AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL.

The best answer is that given by Defendant Lewis in

T. Vol III p. 643:
...Well, Milne precipitating it and Trees disclaiming any
responsibility for his agents, I told myself, 'Look, I'm too
old for the rest of my life to put up with this kind of interactivity that was always leading -- keeping me on tenderhooks.'
And I think it was at that time that I called the lawyer and
decided that I'd better go in another direction.
Defendant Lewis is still on

"tenderhooks".

This case was brought

before this Court so that the law of contracts as pertains to this
case could be firmly established to the end that Defendant would
obtain the relief to which he is entitled.
It is submitted that the Judgment and Decree of the lower
Court be reversed and Judgment be entered in favor of Defendant
Lewis, or, in the alternative, that this Court grant a new trial, a
trial that would now be short and to the point.
Respectfully submitted this -£EK1 day of April, 1984.
BELL & BELL, b

y. Richard Bell
/Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
( Walter Lewis
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